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Abstract
This paper discusses the dimension problem in economic aggregation, as it
relates to ecological and biophysical economics. The dimension problem con-
sists of a simple dilemma: when we aggregate, the observer must choose the
dimension of analysis. The dilemma is that this choice affects the resulting mea-
surement. This means that aggregate measurements are dependent on one’s
goals, and on underlying theory. I explore the consequences of this predicament
for ecological and biophysical economics. I discuss the many problems of using
‘real’ monetary value as the dimension of analysis. And I highlight how the di-
mension problem undermines the practice of seeking ‘optimal’ policy. Although
there are no solutions, I discuss ways that ecological and biophysical economists
can deal with the dimension problem.
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1 Introduction
Aggregation is the practice of combining the multidimensional into a single di-
mension. It is used in all aspects of science. Aggregation occurs when a physicist
sums the mass of many particles, or when an ecologist sums the energy con-
sumption of an ecosystem. The use of aggregation is so commonplace that its
epistemology is often given little thought. This is particularly true in economics
— a field that tends to hide epistemological questions under a fog of mathemat-
ics (Mirowski, 1991; Keen, 2001). Aggregation is often portrayed as a purely
objective process. After all what could be more objective than the act of adding
things up?
This paper highlights some basic problems with aggregation in economics.
As I see it, aggregation involves two types of decisions:
1. Choosing a system boundary;
2. Choosing a measurement dimension.
When we choose a system boundary, we decide what to include in our mea-
surement, and what to exclude. When we chose a measurement dimension, we
decide how to make the incommensurable commensurable. The problem is that
both boundary and dimensional choices are subjective — they depend on our
goals. Yet these decisions affect the resulting aggregation. Giampietro, Allen
and Mayumi (2006) call this the “epistemological predicament associated with
purposive quantitative analysis” — “the observer always affects what is observed
when defining the descriptive domain”.
This paper explores the aggregation predicament, with a specific focus on
measurement dimensions. I discuss how dimensional problems affect economic
aggregation, and explore the implications for ecological and biophysical eco-
nomics.
1.1 Moving Beyond the ‘Boundary Critique’
Critics of economic aggregation usually focus on boundary decisions. This is
understandable. The national accounts are based on dubious boundary choices.
For instance, they exclude unpaid domestic work (Messac, 2018; Waring, 1999).
They also exclude environmental degradation, social ‘bads’, resource depletion,
and ecosystem services (Daly and Cobb, 1994; Daly and Farley, 2011; Dixon and
Hamilton, 1996; Costanza and Daly, 1992; Kubiszewski et al, 2013).
I agree that the national accounts use questionable boundaries. I also agree
that choosing ‘better’ boundaries seems like a good idea. However, I am con-
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cerned that the ‘boundary critique’ distracts us from a more fundamental prob-
lem. Economists have based their accounting system on the dimension of mon-
etary value. Yet this dimension is unstable. Prices change over time in divergent
ways. This changing meter stick wreaks havoc with objective measurement.
Should we reform a system based on such an unreliable dimension? I argue we
should not. Instead, we need to ask some more basic questions. What are we
trying to sustain? What dimension is appropriate? There are no simple answers.
But as long as we focus only on boundaries, we will not ask these important
questions.
1.2 Goals
This paper has three goals. The first goal is to show how dimensional choices
affect aggregation (Section 2). When we choose dimensions, we choose how to
weight different attributes against one another. The problem is that this choice
affects the resulting aggregation. The usefulness of an aggregation thus depends
on agreement about the appropriate dimension. If our goals are contested and
the relevant dimensions are ambiguous, aggregation should be avoided.
My second goal is to show what goes wrong when we choose monetary value
as the aggregation dimension (Section 3). The national accounts use monetary
value to aggregate economic output (among other things). I discuss how dimen-
sional problems undermine this approach. The problem is that prices — our unit
of analysis — are unstable over time. This instability wreaks havoc with objective
measurement. When we attempt to ‘correct’ for inflation, we must make many
subjective decisions. The result is a measure that is riddled with uncertainty. I
discuss how this affects attempts at national accounts boundary reforms. I also
discuss the implications for economic growth accounting.
My third goal is to highlight how the dimension problem affects economic
decision-making (Section 4). Neoclassical economists often claim to identify
policies that are optimal (i.e. best for everybody). This approach has signifi-
cantly influenced sustainability policy. Yet it has a simple problem. Optimiza-
tion requires aggregation. Thus, the search for ‘optimal’ policy inherits all the
dimensional pitfalls of aggregation itself. To deal with these problems, I pro-
pose a checklist to determine if optimization is appropriate. If the checklist is
not met, then the use of optimization is likely pernicious. It gives ethical and
moral preferences the appearance of scientific rigor.
I conclude with thoughts about how to address the aggregation dimension
problem (Section 5). Although there are no ‘solutions’, there are ways to cope
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with the problem. For too long, economic aggregation problems have simply
been ignored. If economics is to be reintegrated with the natural sciences (Hall
et al, 2001), these issues must be addressed.
2 The Dimension Problem
Aggregation requires making the incommensurable commensurable. We begin
with incommensurable items — ‘apples’ and ‘oranges’ — and then use a common
dimension to make them commensurable. The dimension converts qualities into
quantities that can then be universally compared.
Throughout this paper I will speak of dimension choice, a concept that is likely
foreign to many natural scientists. In the context of basic science, dimensions
are not usually thought of as a ‘choice’ — they are usually taken as a given. For
instance, if we want to measure inertia, it is taken as a given that we should use
the dimension of mass. This stems from the universal acceptance of Newton’s
laws, which state that resistance to acceleration (inertia) is proportional to mass.
But it has not always been obvious that mass is the only relevant dimension for
inertia. On Earth a feather falls more slowly than a brick. Does this mean that
inertia is related to the dimension of surface area? That we can exclude this
possibility is an important scientific achievement.
In economics, things are quite different. For instance, there is no well-tested
theory that singles out the correct dimension for economic output. In economics,
aggregation dimensions are a subjective choice. The dimension problem stems
from this choice. Simply put, the subjective choice of dimension affects the
aggregation.
2.1 When There is No Dimension Problem
Let’s begin with instances when there is no dimension problem. This happens
when we aggregate items that are identical and unchanging. In this case, we are
aggregating items that are already commensurable. Thus dimensional choices
do not affect the aggregation.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. Here we imagine aggregating a stock of iden-
tical apples. Clearly the apple stock in Scenario A is half that of Scenario B. This
is true no matter what dimensions we use to aggregate apples (mass, volume,
energy, etc.). Since all apples are identical, they all share the same attributes.
Thus the choice of attribute does not affect the stock-size ratio between the two
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scenarios. There is no dimension problem because aggregation reduces to arith-
metic.
Scenario A:
Scenario B:
Figure 1: Unambiguous Aggregation
This type of aggregation is something we rarely do in the real world. Yet it is
a common assumption in economic theory. For instance, Robert Solow (1956)
begins his famous treatise on economic growth theory by assuming that “There
is only one commodity, output as a whole”. His reason for doing so is telling.
It is so he can “speak unambiguously of the community’s real income” (ibid).
What does he mean by this? Solow is essentially assuming away the dimension
problem. In a one-commodity economy, dimensional choices do not affect the
measured growth of economic output. Thus changes in output are completely
unambiguous, as are changes in real income.
Solow is not alone in making this assumption. The single-commodity econ-
omy is a foundational assumption in neoclassical theory. For instance, Colacchio
(2018) observes that “the only case consistent with the [neoclassical] marginal
productivity theory is that of a ‘one-commodity’ economy”. Neoclassical eco-
nomic theory assumes a world in which there is no ambiguity in aggregation.
That this assumption is obviously violated in the real world is a searing indict-
ment of the theory.
2.2 Illustrating the Dimension Problem
I now move on to the more realistic scenario of aggregating items that are not
identical. In this situation, the choice of dimension is not neutral.
The best way to understand the dimension problem is through a two-
commodity example. Suppose we are shopkeepers who have a stock of apples
and bread slices. Like many shopkeepers, we are not satisfied to state that we
have x apples and y slices of bread. Instead, we want to know the size of our
total inventory. How do we go about calculating this quantity?
Let’s set aside the fact that most shopkeepers care about the monetary value
of their stock. (I will deal with monetary value later). Instead, let’s assume that
we want a physical measure of the size of our stock. This is simple enough to
do — we just need to choose a dimension of analysis. Let’s choose between
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dimensions of mass, volume, and energy. Table 1 shows realistic values for the
average mass, volume and energy content of apples and bread slices. We simply
choose one of these dimensions, and use it to aggregate our total stock.
Table 1: Measuring apples and bread slices using different dimensions
Mass (g) Volume (cm3) Energy (cal)
Apple 75 104 39
Bread Slice 30 52 79
But there is a problem. The choice of dimension is subjective — it depends on
our goals. Yet this choice plays a crucial role in determining the measurement
results. To understand this dilemma, it is helpful to reflect on what choosing
a dimension does. The dimension determines the relative weight assigned to
each element. In our example, the dimension determines how we weight apples
relative to bread slices. The problem is that different dimensions lead to different
weightings. The dimensions of mass, volume, and energy lead to the following
weightings between apples and bread slices:
Mass: 1 apple= 2.5 bread slices (1)
Volume: 1 apple= 2.0 bread slices (2)
Energy: 1 apple= 0.5 bread slices (3)
These different weightings can lead to divergent measures for the aggregate
stock of apples and bread slices. We can illustrate this problem by construct-
ing an indexed time series of the size of our stock. Over a period of 30 hours,
suppose the individual stock of apples and bread slices changed as shown in
Figure 2A. Assuming that apples and bread slices are uniform, we can state that
the stock of bread slices increased by 164%, while the stock of apples decreased
by 70%. There is no ambiguity here. We would get the same result no matter
what dimension of analysis we chose for each series.
However, this is not true when we move to an aggregate analysis. Figure 2B
shows the indexed growth of the aggregate apple-bread stock. Three time series
are shown — one for each dimension of analysis. Note the significant discrep-
ancy between the three series. When measured in terms of caloric energy, the
size of our apple-bread stock increases by 86%. Yet when measured in terms of
mass, the same stock appears to decrease in size by 3%. What is going on here?
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Figure 2: Aggregating a Stock of Apples and Bread slices
This figure shows how the choice of dimension of analysis affects aggregate measures
of quantity. We imagine that a shopkeeper has a stock of apples and bread slices. Panel
A shows how the number of apples and bread slices changes over a period of 30 hours.
Panel B shows three different indexed aggregate measures of the same stock, calculated
using dimensions of energy, volume, and mass (with values from Table 1). Different
dimensions lead to a different weighting between apples and bread slices, which causes
divergent measures for the growth of the aggregate stock. This figure is inspired by Fig.
8.1 in Nitzan and Bichler (2009).
This large discrepancy is caused by our dimensions. When we change dimen-
sions, we change the relative weighting between apples and bread slices. This
affects how much we weight the increase in the number of bread slices against
the decrease in the number of apples. The result is a divergence in the indexed
growth of our stock.
It might seem reasonable to ask — which index is the ‘correct’ measure of
aggregate quantity? However this question is ill posed. All three measures are
correct in a mathematical sense. Instead, we should ask — which measurement
is appropriate given our goals? It is here that subjectivity enters the equation.
Suppose we want to use our stock to feed a starving population. In this con-
text, caloric energy content seems the most appropriate choice of dimension.
But if we wanted to calculate shipping costs, then mass is likely the best dimen-
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sion. The choice of dimension depends on our goals. Yet it affects the aggregate
measurement. This is the crux of the dimension problem.
This dilemma means that when the appropriate dimension is unclear or con-
tested, aggregation may be unwise. For instance, suppose we want to aggregate
fresh water and bituminous coal to create an index of ‘natural capital’. It is un-
clear what dimension we should use. Fresh water and bituminous coal have
completely different uses. If we value objectivity, it is likely better to treat water
and coal as incommensurable. In other words, we should avoid aggregation.
To summarize, aggregation requires subjective choices about the dimension
of analysis. These choices then affect the resulting measurement. Once it is
pointed out, the dimension problem is simple to understand. It borders on triv-
ial. Yet it has far-reaching consequences for economics. By the end of this pa-
per, the reader should see a repeating story. Aggregation requires subjective
decisions. Unsurprisingly, economists make subjective decisions in order to ag-
gregate. But here is the unsettling part. They do not acknowledge that these
decisions are subjective. Moreover, they do not explore the consequences of
making different decisions. This behavior is an anathema to good science. It
needs to be fixed if we wish to construct a legitimate “science of sustainability”
(Dodds, 1997).
3 Monetary Value: The Changing Meter Stick
I move now to a dimension problem that is unique to economics. A defining
feature of economics is its use of monetary value as a dimension of analysis. I
will first discuss when this is unproblematic. If our interest is in prices themselves,
then monetary value is a valid dimension of analysis. However, economists often
use prices to measure ‘real’ quantities of production. When used this way, we run
into a sea of epistemological problems. The result is irreducible measurement
uncertainty.
3.1 Prices for their Own Sake? Or Prices for ‘Real’ Quantities?
There are two ways to think about money and prices. The first is to think like a
capitalist. The second is to think like an economist.
Capitalists are interested in prices for their own sake. A capitalist does not
generally care ‘what’ or ‘how much’ he owns (in any physical sense). Instead,
he cares about the monetary value of what he owns. And this is only relevant in
comparison to the value of other things. Nitzan and Bichler (2009) observe that
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capitalists are interested in differential comparison — comparing the monetary
value of one thing to another (at a given point in time). If we aggregate mon-
etary value for differential comparison, there are no epistemological problems
(although we may raise ethical objections).
In contrast, economists are generally not interested in prices for their own
sake.1 Instead, they are interested in the ‘real’ sphere of production. Economists
want to know ‘what’ and ‘how much’ is produced. Prices are merely the window
into this ‘real sphere’ — a facade that needs to be removed. Economists suppose
that aggregate market value (Y ) can be divided into two components — prices
(P) and some ‘real’ quantity of production Q:
Y = P ·Q (4)
The quantity of production Q is then given by Y /P. This method is how ‘real’
GDP is calculated. We take nominal GDP and ‘adjust’ for inflation using a price
index. The result is ‘real’ GDP — the ‘real’ quantity of production.
This type of ‘real’ measurement is a foundational goal of the national ac-
counts. Taken at face value it appears to be unproblematic. But when we dig
beneath the surface, we find that ‘adjusting’ for inflation requires a host of sub-
jective decisions. The problem is that prices are an unstable unit — a changing
meter stick that wreaks havoc with objective measurement.
3.2 The Purpose of a Unit
What goes wrong when we aggregate using ‘real’ monetary value? To under-
stand the problem, we need to understand the measurement role of units. A
unit’s purpose is to be uniform. Thus, when we use a meter stick, the actual
length of the stick is not important. What matters is that every meter stick is as
close to the same length as possible. For this reason, scientists devote great effort
to precisely defining units. For instance, the meter is now defined as the length
of the path traveled by light in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299,792,458
of a second (Petley, 1983).
A clearly defined unit makes precise measurement possible. Conversely, a
poorly defined unit makes precise measurement impossible. Consider the ‘foot’
as a unit of measure. Although it is now precisely defined, the ‘foot’ originates
in the practice of using literal human feet to measure length (Dilke and Dilke,
1This position was summarized by John Stuart Mill (1848) when he wrote: “There cannot ...
be intrinsically a more insignificant thing, in the economy of society, than money.”
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1987). Since foot size varies between individuals, we can imagine how this led
to uncertainty in measurement. Prices, it turns out, fail the uniformity condition
in a spectacular way. This means that they fail as a unit of measure.
3.3 Divergent Price Change
The problem is not so much that prices change — it is that prices change in non-
uniform ways. I want to emphasize this point, because we often think of inflation
as a uniform increase in all prices. If this was true, ‘correcting’ for inflation would
be unproblematic. In reality, price change is not uniform. It varies dramatically
between different commodities.
Figures 3A and 3B illustrate this effect using data from the US consumer price
index (CPI). Figure 3A shows price changes for ten selected CPI commodities,
while Figure 3B shows price changes for all CPI commodities. The range of price
change is astonishing. Since 1935, the price of apples increased by a factor of
50, the price of electricity increased by a factor of 7, and the price of TVs actually
declined. (TV price decline has mostly to do with quality adjustments, discussed
below).
This divergent price change means that our unit is unstable. The effect on
aggregation is the same as when we changed dimensions in our apple-bread ex-
ample (Fig. 2). Divergent price changes cause the relative weighting between
commodities to change with time. This means that our measure of aggregate
quantity is affected by our choice of price ‘base-year’. This problem was identi-
fied over a century ago by Francis Edgeworth (1887):
If one great group of commodities varies pretty uniformly in one direction,
and another in a different direction (or even in the same direction but in a
markedly different degree), then the task of restoring the level of prices can
no longer be regarded as a purely objective ... problem. (cited in Vining and
Elwertowski (1976))[emphasis added]
To quantify the scale of the problem, we can calculate the relative standard
deviation of US price change. (Relative standard deviation is defined as the stan-
dard deviation divided by the mean). Between 1935 and 2013, price change for
all CPI commodities had a relative standard deviation of about 40%. This 40%
uncertainty makes other poorly defined units look precise in comparison. Con-
sider the unit of the ‘man’, defined as the length of the man doing the measuring.
It is hard to imagine doing accurate science with this length unit. Yet the uncer-
tainty in male height is only about 4%.2 Thus, the unit of the ‘man’ is about 10
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times more accurate than using US prices as a unit of measure.
3.4 Price Instability Leads to Real GDP Uncertainty
The problem with price instability is that it leads to ambiguity when we try
to ‘adjust’ for inflation. This leads to ambiguity in time-series based on ‘real’
monetary value. Let’s use real GDP as an example. The ambiguity in real GDP
is not easy to spot. Governments publish only a single official measure of real
GDP, and they do not report uncertainty. But if we look under the hood of real
GDP calculations, we find significant ambiguity.
Let’s review the problem. To calculate real GDP, we pick a base year and hold
prices constant. Prices in this year assign a relative weight to each commodity.
We then use these weights to aggregate all commodities into a single measure
of economic output. The problem is that prices change in non-uniform ways
over time. This means that different base years assign a different weighting be-
tween commodities. The choice of base year therefore affects the growth of real
GDP. Since the choice of base year is subjective, we are left with unavoidable
ambiguity in our measure. (This problem is the same as the dimension problem
illustrated in Figure 2. When we change base-year prices, the effect is the same
as literally changing dimensions).
Sometimes the base-year effect can be enormous. Nigeria recently switched
from a 1990 to a 2010 base year, resulting in a doubling of GDP (Blas and Wal-
lis, 2014). A similar doubling of GDP occurred when Ghana changed its base
year from 1993 to 2006. Base-year revisions in Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania and
Zambia have also led to large changes in GDP (Jerven, 2012, 2014).
In the US, the uncertainty in real GDP growth is sizable. Figure 3C shows
how the choice of base year affects the growth of US real GDP per capita. This
analysis indicates a 30% uncertainty in the growth of US GDP per capita over the
last 60 years. This estimate is conservative because it does not include the uncer-
tainty involved in quality-change adjustments (discussed below). Interestingly,
the official measure of real GDP growth (dashed line) is at the upper end of the
uncertainty range. Is this a coincidence? It would be interesting to repeat this
analysis for other countries to see if official real GDP measures always lie at the
upper end of the base-year uncertainty range. This would indicate systematic
bias in government methods.
Of course, measurement uncertainty is an unavoidable part of empirical sci-
ence. Good science requires being honest and open about measurement un-
2 The relative standard deviation of adult males is roughly 4% (Smith et al, 2000).
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Figure 3: Divergent Price Change and Divergent Measure of Real GDP
This figure shows how divergent changes in price affect the measurement of US real
GDP. Panel A shows historical price changes in ten selected commodities tracked by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Panel B shows divergent price change for all CPI commodi-
ties. Divergent price change means that the choice of base year has a strong effect on
the measurement of real GDP growth, as shown in Panel C. For sources and methods,
see the Appendix.
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certainty. The problem in economics is twofold. First, we cannot reduce the
uncertainty associated with the base-year problem. This is because the problem
resides in the unit itself (prices). So long as price change is divergent, we cannot
avoid the base-year problem.
Second, the economics discipline is not open about measurement uncertainty
in real GDP. US government economists are aware of the base-year problem.3 But
instead of admitting that this leads to uncertainty, they have taken the opposite
road. The US government has imposed an official way of hiding the problem.
This is called the ‘chain-weighting’ method (Steindel, 1995). It involves using
a moving average over multiple base years. But this approach does not solve
the underlying problem — indeed the problem cannot be solved. Prices are an
unstable unit of measure, and no amount of mathematical wizardry can change
this.
3.5 The Quality-Change Problem
The base-year problem is not the only issue with aggregating using ‘real’ mon-
etary value. We must also measure the changing quality of commodities.
Economists adopt the following convention: changes in commodity quality are
converted into a change in economic quantity. This leads to a simple question:
in what dimension do we measure quality change?
Consider the example of computers. Imagine an economy that in 1983, pro-
duced 100 Apple IIe computers. In 2017, the same economy produced 100
iMac Pros. Has economic output remained the same? If not, how much has it
changed? To answer this question we must convert computer quality changes
into quantity changes. But how should we do this? Here the dimension problem
rears its head again. The quality-to-quantity conversion depends on the dimen-
sion of analysis. In terms of mass, computer output has probably declined in
our hypothetical economy. But in terms of processing power, computer output
has greatly increased. Thus, the choice of quality-change dimension affects our
measure of output change.
Again, this is just the dimension problem. How we choose to measure out-
put determines how we measure quality change (and vice versa). The choice
then affects our results. But in economics we run into a further problem. Eco-
3 For instance, US Federal Reserve economist Karl Whelan nicely captures real GDP uncer-
tainty: “Take 1998 as an example: The growth rate of fixed-weight real GDP in this year was 4.5
percent if we use 1995 as the base year; using 1990 prices it was 6.5 percent; using 1980 prices
it was 18.8 percent; and using 1970 prices, it was a stunning 37.4 percent!” (Whelan, 2002).
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nomic output is ostensibly measured using monetary value. But monetary value
is unreliable for measuring quality change. Why? Because prices change over
time even when commodities stay the same. Price change might reflect a change
in a commodity’s quality. But it might also reflect pure inflation. The logical
conclusion should be that prices cannot measure quality change.
But this is not the conclusion reached by most price-index economists. In-
stead, they assume that prices reveal a hidden dimension that itself measures
quality change. What is this dimension? It is utility — the pleasure derived
from a product. Describing this ‘hedonic’ approach, the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics writes:
In price index methodology, hedonic quality adjustment has come to mean the
practice of decomposing an item into its constituent characteristics, obtaining
estimates of the value of the utility derived from each characteristic, and using
those value estimates to adjust prices when the quality of a good changes.
(BLS, 2010) [emphasis added]
Let’s unpack what is going on here. Price-index statisticians are using neo-
classical theory to justify a particular way of measuring quality change. The
idea is that utility is the relevant dimension of quality change. The problem is
that utility is unobservable on its own (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009). Instead, it is
‘revealed’ through prices (Samuelson, 1938, 1948). This inversion makes the
whole process circular.4 Indeed, Joan Robinson (1962) famously observed that
utility is a circular concept: “Utility is the quality in commodities that makes indi-
viduals want to buy them, and the fact that individuals want to buy commodities
shows that they have utility” [emphasis in original].
This discussion boils down to basic questions about the dimension of eco-
nomic output. Is it (unobservable) utility, as hedonic quality adjustment im-
plies? Or is it something else entirely? Economists need to take this dimension
problem seriously.
The scale of the problem is illustrated in Figure 4. Here I return to the exam-
ple of computers. Figure 4A plots measures of computer quality change adopted
by 8 different OECD nations. Bars show the annual average percentage change
in computer quality from 1995 to 2001. (For methods used to derive this data,
see the Appendix). The dispersion in these measures has little to do with the
computers themselves. (Computers are produced using a global supply chain.
As a rough approximation, we can treat computers as being the same in all coun-
4 Aside from circularity, there is another problem with this approach. Experiments indicate
that individuals systematically violate the axioms of revealed preference theory (Sippel, 1997).
In other words, the theory behind hedonic quality adjustment has been falsified.
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Figure 4: Divergent Measures of Computer Quality Change
This figure illustrates the dispersion in national estimates for rate of change of computer
quality. Panel A shows computer quality change estimates for 8 OECD nations. Bars rep-
resent the average annual growth rate of computer quality between 1995 to 2001. Panel
B shows how these quality change measurements would affect the growth of computer
‘output’ over 30 years. Assuming the number of computers produced remains the same
in each year, the different quality adjustments lead to divergent measures of computer
output growth spanning 3 orders of magnitude.
tries). Instead, this dispersion results from the different methods used to mea-
sure computer quality change. Summarizing the methods in 2004, the OECD
observes:
The United States, Canada, France and Australia employ hedonic methods,
and show the fastest rates of price decline. Although a hedonic price index
has recently been developed in Germany, and introduced into the consumer
price index, the investment deflator shown here is still based on the previous
methodology. This explains its slower rate of change. No hedonic adjustment
is carried out in Italy and in the United Kingdom. Japan constructs a hedonic
producer price index for ICT hardware but it is not clear whether this deflator
is also used in the national accounts. (OECD, 2004)
The scale of this quality-change dispersion is deceptively large. Consider
what happens when we project it over thirty years. We assume that the number
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of computers produced in each country remains constant over time. But we
continue to apply the quality-change adjustments shown in Figure 4A. How is
computer output affected?
Remember that quality change metrics convert qualities into quantities. If the
quality of computers improves by a factor of 2, this gets converted into a factor
of 2 growth in computer quantity. Figure 4 shows the results of a thirty-year
extrapolation. The differing quality-change adjustments lead to a 3 orders of
magnitude disparity in the measured growth of computer output.
This uncertainty demonstrates a fundamental aspect of the aggregation prob-
lem. There is no ‘correct’ way to convert qualities into quantities. Any such con-
version depends on our goals, which will determine the dimension we consider
appropriate. And different approaches can lead to wildly different measures.
This epistemological predicament is not dealt with honestly by economists.
Again and again, subjective dimensional decisions are not recognized as
such. Economists assume that utility is the ‘correct’ dimension of quality change.
They turn to utility because prices themselves are an unreliable measure of qual-
ity change. And yet utility is never actually observed. It is ‘inferred’ from prices
— the very unit that proved unreliable in the first place. This whole process
serves to mask a myriad of subjective decisions about how quality change is
measured.5 The result is significant hidden uncertainty in the measure of ‘real’
monetary value.
3.6 The Failure of ‘Real’ Monetary Value: Some Implications
My goal in this section has been to show what goes wrong when we use monetary
value as the aggregation dimension. Here is a summary:
1. Prices are an unstable unit;
2. ‘Correcting’ for this instability requires subjective decisions;
3. This causes significant uncertainty in measures of ‘real’ monetary value.
4. Governments do not report this uncertainty.
These problems have important implications for ecological and biophysical
economists. I explore some of these below.
5 For a thorough review of the many subjective choices used in quality-change adjustments,
see Nitzan (1992).
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Implications for Boundary Reforms of the National Accounts
For those who seek national accounts boundary reforms, the above problems
should cause some soul searching. Even when we accept the boundary choices
made by the national accounts, the system still fails. A major goal of the na-
tional accounts is to objectively measure the growth of economic production.
Yet the system cannot deliver this goal. The need to ‘correct’ for inflation causes
unavoidable ambiguity in real GDP and other ‘quantity’ measures (such as the
capital stock).
Given this ambiguity, is it worth reforming the national accounts to include
environmental and social externalities? I argue that it is not. When we do so,
we simply increase the level of ambiguity in our measure. Not only do we keep
the ambiguity in ‘correcting’ for inflation, we add the even greater ambiguity
of valuing non-market items. Moreover, ecological economists often use neo-
classical methods for valuing non-market items. At the very least, we need to
be aware of the problems with these methods, and investigate how alternative
methods would change our results. (For a critical discussion of neoclassical val-
uation, see Diamond and Hausman 1994; Dore 1996; Eberle and Hayden 1991).
When it comes to sustainability issues, I argue that the national accounts are not
worth reforming. The problems with using monetary value as the dimension of
analysis are simply too severe.
Implications for Economic Growth Accounting
Let’s move on and consider how ‘real’ monetary value ambiguity impacts the field
of ‘growth accounting’. This field seeks to quantify how different factors (such as
labor and capital) drive economic growth. Mainstream growth accounting has
tended to ignored the role of energy (and other natural resources). Ecological
and biophysical economists have devoted significant effort to fixing this neglect.
Over the last 40 years, many studies have analyzed energy’s role in driving the
growth of real GDP (Ayres and Warr, 2005, 2010; Beaudreau, 1998; Cleveland
et al, 1984; Hall et al, 2001; Hannon and Joyce, 1981; Kummel, 1982, 1989;
Kummel et al, 1985, 2000; Kaufmann, 1992).
But aside from neglecting natural resources, there is a more basic flaw with
growth accounting. The field assumes that real GDP is an unambiguous measure
of economic output. But is it? As Figure 3C shows, there is significant ambiguity
in the growth or real GDP. This is because the calculation of real GDP requires
enumerable subjective decisions. Given this subjectivity, I argue that the growth
of real GDP is not worth explaining.
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Consider the following thought experiment. Using the tools of growth ac-
counting, we find that the growth of energy use accounts for 70% of the growth
of US real GDP. Suppose that the government then adopts different methodolog-
ical decisions. These lead to a large revision in GDP growth (as Fig. 3B shows is
possible). We find that energy growth now accounts for a very different fraction
of real GDP growth. This raises an uncomfortable question. Can the govern-
ment’s subjective decisions change the role that energy plays in the economy?
One hopes not. Instead, the logical conclusion is that we are trying to explain
something that is not worth explaining.
But if we abandon real GDP, what should economic growth theory seek to ex-
plain? One possibility is to focus on the growth of biophysical flows. The impor-
tance of these flows follows directly from thermodynamic principles (Georgescu-
Roegen, 1971; Kondepudi and Prigogine, 1998; Hall and Klitgaard, 2012; Pri-
gogine et al, 1984). Importantly, they can be measured in well-defined biophys-
ical dimensions. Fix (2015) presents a first attempt at this type of approach
(focusing on energy). Of course, focusing on biophysical flows does not make
the aggregation problem go away (Giampietro et al, 2013). But at the very least,
it ensures a stable unit of analysis — something that cannot be said for monetary
value.
3.7 Summary: A New Old Problem
Although the problems with aggregating ‘real’ monetary value are severe, they
are not new. Most were highlighted more than sixty years ago in the ‘Cam-
bridge capital controversy’.6 This was a debate in the 1950s and 1960s between
economists in Cambridge, England and Cambridge, Massachusetts. Joan Robin-
son (1953) began the debate when she asked — in what unit is capital mea-
sured? This prompted a protracted exchange that culminating in the Cambridge,
England school demonstrating that there is no way to measure the quantity of
capital independently of prices and distribution (Hodgson, 2005).
Unfortunately, the conclusions of the Cambridge capital controversy have
been mostly ignored by mainstream economists. Why? The conclusions are
likely too discomforting. The national accounts cannot unambiguously measure
the growth of the capital stock or economic output. If we accept this critique, it
leaves a gaping hole in the heart of economic theory.
6 For a summary of the Cambridge debate, see Cohen and Harcourt (2003), Felipe and Fisher
(2003), Harcourt (2015). For a broad discussion of the problems with measuring capital, see
Nitzan and Bichler (2009).
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4 Aggregation and ‘Optimal’ Decision Making
The implications of the aggregation dimension problem are too extensive to ex-
plore fully here. But I do want to highlight how this problem affects the search
for ‘optimal’ policy. Optimization plays a major role in sustainability policy dis-
cussions. But is it a sound approach? When we view policy optimization through
a dimensional lens, some gaping flaws become evident.
4.1 The Search for Social Optimums
Neoclassical economics claims it can identify optimal policy that is ‘best’ for ev-
erybody. This claim is so important that it has been cited as a core goal of eco-
nomics:
Making optimal use of scarce resources, that is, maximizing subject to con-
straints, is the central theme of economics” (Dixit, 1990) [emphasis added].
Thus, economists have theories for (among other things) optimal taxation
(Sandmo, 1976), optimal investment (Abel, 1983), optimal government size
(Karras, 1996), optimal economic growth (Koopmans, 1965), optimal levels of
pollution control (Kwerel, 1977), optimal abatement of CO2 emissions (Nord-
haus, 1992; Goulder and Mathai, 2000), optimal use of resources (Burt, 1964;
Forster, 1980), and optimal population size (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1985).
These theories may seem arcane, but they have a real impact on govern-
ment policy. In his work on optimal climate-change policy, William Nordhaus
claimed that a “modest carbon tax” was preferable to “rigid emissions stabi-
lization” (Nordhaus, 1992). Politicians have used this work to justify the tepid
climate policy seen to date (Linden, 2018).
4.2 Dimensional Choices Affect the Optimum
The problem with using optimization for decision-making is that it requires uni-
dimensional aggregation. Only functions that return a single dimension can be
optimized. Functions that return two or more dimensions do not have optimums
— they have trade offs. Thus to seek optimal policy, one must decide on a single
dimension of analysis. Optimization therefore inherits all of the issues associ-
ated with aggregation itself. When we seek ‘optimal’ policy, dimensional choices
will affect the aggregation and thus the optimum.
To illustrate how dimensional choices affect optimization, I return to the
example of a stock of apples and bread slices. Suppose we need to maximize
Aggregation and ‘Optimal’ Decision Making 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0
50
100
150
200
250
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario A Scenario B
ca
lo
rie
s
gr
am
s
Energy Mass
Figure 5: Measurements of the Maximum Stock of Apples and Bread Slices
Which scenario (A or B) maximizes the apple-bread stock? This figure shows how the
choice of dimension affects the maximizing scenario. When measured in terms of caloric
energy (left), Scenario A maximizes the stock. However, when measured in terms of
mass, Scenario B maximizes the stock. Calculations use values from Table 1.
our stock by choosing between two scenarios. In Scenario A, we have 3 apples
and 2 bread slices, while in Scenario B, we have 2 apples and 3 bread slices (see
Fig. 5). Which stock is larger?
The problem is that without defining a single dimension to be maximized,
this question has no meaning. Scenario A and Scenario B involve an incommen-
surable trade-off between an additional apple or an additional bread slice. To
make a judgment about the maximum stock, we must make the scenarios com-
mensurable. This requires choosing a single dimension of analysis. The problem
is that the choice of aggregation dimension affects what we find. As shown in
Figure 5, when we aggregate in terms of energy, we find that Scenario A max-
imizes the apple-bread stock. However, when we aggregate in terms of mass,
Scenario B maximizes the stock. This is because dimensional choice affects the
relative weighting between apples and bread slices.
As this example illustrates, optimization is affected by subjective dimensional
decisions. Different decisions will lead to different ‘optimal’ solutions. The
search for ‘optimal’ policy thus depends crucially on our goals and our result-
ing choice of dimensions.
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4.3 An Aggregation and Optimization Checklist
Because optimization depends on pre-analytic decisions, it must be used care-
fully. Optimization is a powerful decision-making tool when used appropriately.
Unfortunately, it is also a powerful tool for persuasion that can be easily mis-
used. To guard against misuse, I suggest we ask the following questions of any
optimization procedure:
1. Are the underlying goals well defined and uncontested?
2. Does the dimension of analysis follow unambiguously from the goals?
3. Does the dimension provide an objective way to weight attributes?
If we answer ‘yes’ to all three questions, then the optimization is likely unprob-
lematic. But if we answer ‘no’ to one or more questions, then the use of opti-
mization is likely pernicious. Let’s consider some examples.
Unproblematic Optimization
Suppose we want to design a gasoline engine with fixed horsepower that uses
as little fuel as possible. In this case the goal is clear — minimize fuel use for a
given level of power output. From this goal, the relevant optimization dimension
(gasoline energy input) follows unambiguously. The science of energetics then
defines how to measure the energy content in fuel, ensuring that the weighting
of attributes is determined objectively. In this situation, optimization is unprob-
lematic.
Vague and Contested Goals
Let’s move from this engineering example to the kind of problem that modern
policy makers face. Suppose we need to craft climate change policy. What is our
goal? Is it to lower greenhouse gas emissions? Or simply lower their growth?
Is it to save human lives (now and in the future)? Is it to achieve sustainable
economic growth? Is it to maximize the present value of human welfare? In sus-
tainability situations such as this, our goals are rarely well defined. If we cannot
agree on goals, then there is no point in searching for an ‘optimal’ solution, since
this does not exist without first agreeing on goals.
Ambiguous Dimensions
Often policy makers simply define the goal to be achieved. (This is, after all,
what politicians do). So let’s consider a specific sustainability goal. Suppose we
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want to choose the automobile engine (diesel vs. gasoline) that will have the
least ‘environmental impact’.
The problem is that this goal does not lead unambiguously to a dimension of
analysis. These leads to ambiguity in the ‘best’ choice of automobile. Consider
two different interpretations of our goal. If ‘environmental impact’ means carbon
emissions, then diesel is the superior technology. Diesel engines are more fuel
efficient, and therefore emit less carbon dioxide. However, if ‘environmental
impact’ means human health problems caused by particulate matter or nitrogen
oxides, then diesel engines are worse than gasoline engines (Ghose, 2015).
Unfortunately this example is not a thought experiment. It has recently
played out in Europe. To meet Kyoto obligations, many European countries
promoted a rapid switch from gasoline to diesel cars. But policy makers did not
consider how this would affect air quality. The widespread adoption of diesel
engines led to a predictable rise in particulate matter pollution (Forrest, 2017).
As a British civil servant put it, the policy choice meant deciding between “killing
people today rather than saving lives tomorrow” (Vidal, 2015).
Subjective Weighting of Attributes
Let’s continue with the gasoline vs. diesel engine question. But now we will
think like economists. We assume that the relevant optimization dimension is
monetary value. In other words, we will conduct a cost-benefit analysis.
The problem is that monetary value does not objectively weight different
environmental impacts. First, there is the problem that inflation makes prices
an unstable unit of analysis. Second, many (if not most) environmental impacts
do not have a market price. Further subjective decisions are required to estimate
this price.
Consider the impact of different types of emissions. Particulate pollution
causes immediate, local deaths. However, carbon emissions will cause future,
global deaths from climate change. How should we weight these different out-
comes? First, there is the issue of pricing life, which is inherently subjective.
Unsurprisingly, different approaches yield drastically different results. Histori-
cal valuation data presented in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) has a relative standard
deviation of 138% . To put this in context, the dispersion in human life valuation
is about 35 times the dispersion of adult male height.
Then there is the issue of weighting future costs against those in the present.
The practice in economics is to ‘discount’ the future. But the choice of discount
rate is subjective and can lead to wildly different valuations. The most famous
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discounting controversy is likely the debate between Nicholas Stern and William
Nordhaus. This was an argument about the ‘correct’ discount rate for climate
change costs. The Stern Review (2006) found that drastic action was required
to avert catastrophic future costs. However, Nordhaus (2007) found that action
was far less urgent. What was the main difference? The Stern Review used
a discount rate of 1.4%, while Nordhaus used a discount rate of 6%. Nitzan
and Bichler (2009) point out the effect this has on future costs: “One thousand
dollars’ worth of environmental damage a hundred years from now, when dis-
counted at 1.4 per cent, has a present value of –$249 (negative since we measure
cost). ... But the same one thousand dollars’ worth of damage, discounted at 6
per cent, has a present value of only –$3.”
Economists continue to debate the ‘correct’ valuation method and the ‘cor-
rect’ discount rate. But this misses the point. The problem resides in the dimen-
sion itself. Monetary value does not provide an objective way to weight different
outcomes. Instead, the analyst must make a host of subjective valuation deci-
sions. These decisions then affect the ‘optimal’ policy. As a result, the ‘optimal’
policy does little more than reflect the preferences of the analyst.
Optimization as a Political Tool
The more we answer ‘no’ to the optimization checklist, the less appropriate it
is to seek ‘optimal’ policy. If we answer ‘no’ to all three aggregation questions,
then optimization is likely pernicious. Why? It hides subjective trade offs that are
otherwise clearly visible. When used this way, optimization serves as a political
tool. It takes a political debate over subjective trade offs and turns it into a
technical dispute for ‘experts’. This gives political and ethical preferences the
appearance of scientific rigor.
5 Addressing the Aggregation Problem
The crux of the aggregation problem is the subjectivity of comparing the incom-
mensurable. To aggregate, we must make subjective decisions about the dimen-
sion of analysis. These decisions then affect our results. There are no ‘solutions’
to the aggregation problem, if by ‘solution’ we mean a way to aggregate that
involves no subjective decisions. But there are ways of addressing the problem.
I outline three possibilities below.
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5.1 Avoid Aggregation
One response to the aggregation problem is to simply avoid aggregation. This is
appropriate for sustainability issues where the relevant dimension is ambiguous
and/or contested. If we cannot agree on the appropriate dimension, this is a sign
that we should not be aggregating. Instead, we should leave incommensurable
trade offs in their own ‘natural’ dimensions. For instance, we might measure
habitat loss in dimensions of area, pollution in dimensions of mass, lives lost in
dimensions of individuals, and so on. Ackerman (2008) recommends this route
as an alternative to cost-benefit analysis:
Most of the information collected for a cost-benefit analysis is useful under any
approach to deliberation. The problems arise only in the final steps of crunch-
ing everything into a single bottom-line number: monetizing non-monetary
benefits, discounting future outcomes, and guesstimating the values of impor-
tant uncertainties all have the effect of distorting and concealing the under-
lying data.
The advantage of not aggregating is that subjective trade offs remain clearly
visible. This allows stakeholders to weight trade offs as they see fit, based on
their own preferences.
5.2 Use Biophysical Dimensions
If we decide to aggregate, then we must use a dimension with well-defined
units. This truism should hardly need stating. Objective measurement requires
a precisely defined unit. And yet the majority of economists seem to ignore
this fact. They continue to use prices to measure quantities such as economic
output and the capital stock. But prices are a spectacularly unstable unit. This
causes tremendous ambiguity in indexes of quantity derived from the national
accounts.
If we value accurate measurement, then we need to stop measuring eco-
nomic quantities using real monetary value. The obvious alternative is to use
biophysical dimensions to measure economic scale. This will remove the prob-
lem of poorly defined units. But it means rethinking what we mean by ‘economic
growth’ and ‘capital accumulation’. It means we cannot speak of these quanti-
ties without first stipulating a dimension. And we should be prepared to find
different results when we look at different dimensions.
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5.3 Be Open About Subjectivity
If we decide to aggregate, then we should be honest about the accompanying
subjectivity. This requires being explicit about goals, and reporting dimensional
decisions honestly and openly. This allows others to evaluate the reasoning be-
hind the aggregation. It is the reasoning itself that gives the analysis meaning.
Acknowledging this fact, Jonathan Nitzan writes:
... any scientific method of measuring ... must, to some extent, be anchored
in our initial values. Indeed, it is these initial values which make our analysis
worthy in the first place, so they must be clearly identified for that analysis to
carry any weight. (Nitzan, 1992) [emphasis added]
When our assumptions are presented openly, they can be debated and tested.
Ecological and biophysical economists should avoid the path taken by main-
stream economics. If we hide our subjective aggregation decisions, or deny that
they exist, we embrace the road to pseudoscience.
6 Conclusions
When the aggregation dimension problem is stated clearly, it borders on trivial.
Aggregation requires comparing incommensurable items using a single dimen-
sion. How we choose to do this affects the resulting aggregation. This episte-
mological predicament is simple when identified. And yet it is easily forgotten.
Why?
I think the root of the problem is that it is surprisingly easy to become obliv-
ious to our own assumptions. As Richard Feynman (1974) said of science, “The
first principle is that you must not fool yourself — and you are the easiest person
to fool”. The problem is that ‘getting fooled’ is a social process as much as an
individual one. Karl Popper (1959) argued that many methodological choices in
science are a result of convention. Founding thinkers make subjective decisions
that are then adopted as conventions by the rest of the field. As conventions
are institutionalized, they begin to appear like ‘objective’ procedures (Nitzan,
1992). Over time, we forget the subjective elements of our methods. When this
happens, we collectively ‘fool ourselves’.
With regard to aggregation, I have argued that mainstream economists have
fooled themselves. They have decided to aggregate economic quantities using
the dimension of monetary value. But prices, it turns out, are an unstable unit.
As a result, many subjective decisions are required to adjust for price instability.
Yet economists have convinced themselves that their methods are objective. As
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a result, the ambiguity in the national accounts remains hidden from the general
observer.
If ecological and biophysical economists want a true ‘science of sustainabil-
ity’, then we need to question the aggregation conventions of mainstream eco-
nomics. For ecological economists, this has meant questioning the boundary
decisions made by the national accounts. But there is a more basic question that
we need to ask. Given the many flaws, do we want to keep aggregating eco-
nomic quantities using ‘real’ monetary value? If not, what dimensions should
we use to measure economic output? For that matter, what dimensions should
we use to measure sustainability? These questions have no easy answers. But
the most important step is recognizing that these dimension questions need to
be asked.
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A Sources and Methods
Fig. 3
Consumer price index data comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics database,
available at https://download.bls.gov/pub/time.series/cu/. Commodities that
exist in 1935 are indexed to 1 in that year. However, many commodities are
introduced after 1935. I deal with these new commodities by indexing them to
the average indexed price of the existing commodities in the sample.
Real GDP data comes from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, series
routputmvqd. This dataset contains ‘vintage’ real GDP calculations using differ-
ent base years between 1965 and 2017. The source data does not calculate real
GDP for years later than the corresponding base year. For instance, GDP data
for base year 1995 ends in 1995. For comparison, I project real GDP growth
up to 2017 (for all series). I do this by first calculating the difference in aver-
age growth rates between the given base-year series (gbase) and the 2017 series
( g¯2017):
g¯∆ =
 
g¯2017 − g¯base
 base
1947
(5)
Here g¯ indicates the geometric mean. The average is calculated from 1947
to the base year in question. I then use the average growth rate difference g¯∆
to project the base-year series up to 2017:
gpro jec t =
 
g2017 − g¯∆
 2017
base
(6)
US population data comes from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, retrieved from
FRED https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/POP. Population data prior to 1952
comes from the Historical Statistics of the United States series Aa6.
Fig. 4
Computer quality-change adjustments are estimated as follows. We begin with
the definition of price index change — the change in price less the change in
quality:
∆price index=∆price−∆quality (7)
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This implies that computer quality change is given by:
∆qualitycomputer =∆pricecomputer −∆price indexcomputer (8)
OECD (2004) provides the change in computer price index between 1995-
2001 for 8 OECD nations. To get the change in computer quality, we need com-
puter price-change estimates for each country. However, this data is difficult to
obtain. As an approximation, I assume that the change in computer price can
be proxied by the official inflation rate in each country. This gives the following
method for estimating the rate of computer quality change:
∆qualitycomputer ≈∆inflation−∆price indexcomputer (9)
For this estimate, I use GDP deflator data from the World Bank (series
NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG). Since official inflation rates in our 8 OECD nations are
very similar, virtually all of the dispersion in computer quality change comes
from dispersion in the computer price index.
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